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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
This thesis revisits the beer distribution game and modifies the model to account for a 
collaborative environment.  The rule set and structure of the game are changed to represent first 
simple information sharing and then co-managed inventory, a more radically collaborative 
business practice.  This approach is taken to critically evaluate collaborative planning and 
information sharing in the context of a small business.  More specifically, this thesis will identify 
the quantifiable benefits achieved through collaboration. 
Background 
The Beer Distribution Game 
The game is played by industry teams.  A team consists of a minimum of four people; at 
least one person is needed at each level of the supply chain to make decisions.  There is a factory 
that produces beer, a distributor, a wholesaler, and finally a retailer that fulfills customer 
demand.  These are represented as squares on a table with two smaller squares between each 
larger square.  The smaller squares represent shipping delays between the levels.  Each decision 
maker sits at their respective level of the supply chain creating a linear distribution down the 
table.   
The goal of the game is to minimize team costs.  Since the purchase cost is disregarded, 
the costs that are being looked at are the holding cost and the backorder cost.  These costs are 
$0.50 and $1.00 per case, per week respectively.  Costs are assessed at each level such that each 
DMU is responsible for a portion of the team costs.   
There are not many rules to the game, but the few rules that do exist must be adhered to 
very carefully.  First, the individual decision making units (DMUs) corresponding to each level 
(retailer, wholesaler, etc.) must act as silos.  They are not allowed to communicate with the other 
levels of the supply chain in any form beyond a number of beer cases on their order form.  This 
form, consequently, is only to be passed one level upstream (wholesaler to distributor, distributor 
to factory, etc.).  The second rule is to not skip any of the steps and to wait for the proctor’s 
instruction to continue with the next step. 
the beginning of each period, chips representing beer cases are moved one spot down 
stream on the board.  Beer that was in transit is, thus, received.  The amount received does not 
necessarily equal the quantity ordered.  The orders from the previous period are then put into 
transit if enough inventory is on hand.  If the on hand inventory is insufficient, the remaining 
portion of the order must be filled in the next round and will be treated as a backlog.  The next 
step is to calculate holding and backlog costs and is done by counting inventory or calculating 
the cumulative backorder.  The final step is to generate new orders and “send” the orders 
upstream bringing the system to the beginning of the next period. 
The simulation is oversimplified, not taking into account any calculations of capacity 
constraints, labor requirements, machine availability (on the factory level), and so forth.  The 
only decision is a seemingly straight forward decision on how much to order for the next period.  
Players are asked at the end of the game what they would change about the game to improve 
their results and to reduce the bullwhip effect.  The most typical answer is to collaborate, or to 
share information, or simply to be able to talk to the other players in their team.   
Revisiting the Beer Distribution Game 
This thesis, being aimed at small businesses, will look back at the beer game with a 
slightly different perspective.  For a portion of the research involved in writing this thesis, a 
group of intelligent, veteran beer game players were hand selected to play the game a few more 
times.  These players are candidates for master of engineering degrees in logistics at the MIT-
Zaragoza International Logistics Program in Zaragoza, Spain.   
Increasing customer demand 
Inventory Position Results for the Initial Game 
The game was played with a demand pattern 
representative of a small business entering a market 
and gaining market share.  The demand increased 
fairly steadily with only one break in the pattern 
which occurred late in the game.  The first round 
was played with the standard rules.  The inventory 
position of each level gives us an insight into the 
costs of the system and additionally shows the 
variability.  The inventory position results of the 
first game are shown to the left. 
The amplification that the beer game is 
known for appeared even with these experienced 
players.  This highlights one of the key points of the 
game; there is an almost unavoidable amplification 
of variability as orders are passed up the supply 
chain.  
Following the research that has been done in 
system dynamics which was discussed in the 
literature review section, the next thing that this 
thesis will look at is automating the system to avoid 
the behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect.  To do 
so, some ordering rules had to be developed to get 
as close to optimal overall costs as possible. The 
optimal cost for the game is obviously zero, but due 
to initial inventories and the fact that backorders 
cost more than inventory, it is expected that some 
level of inventory will be carried.  The inventory 
will act as a smoothing factor for variability in 
demand. 
Retailer
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
Week
In
v
en
to
ry
 
Le
v
el
Wholesaler
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
Week
In
v
en
to
ry
 
Le
ve
l
Distributor
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
Week
In
ve
n
to
ry
 
Le
ve
l
Factory
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
Week
In
v
e
n
to
ry
 
Le
v
e
l
 
Finding near optimal ordering rules involved running simulations in Microsoft Excel.  At 
each level the on hand inventory for a given period equals the incoming order plus the inventory 
from the previous period minus the order from down stream.  Trying out different ordering rules 
provided game costs and insight into ordering.  Even with automation and these near optimal 
ordering by each level the following amplification occurs: 
Inventory Position Results for Automation 
As seen in the above graphs, the factory’s 
variation in inventory is far greater than the 
variation at the retail level.  All of the levels have a 
different base stock policy to account for the 
variability in inventory.  The factory has a base 
stock policy of eight, the distributor has a base stock 
of six, and the wholesaler has a stock level of four.  
These policies represent the safety stock levels of 
each entity to prevent them from going into 
backlogs.   
Each level orders equal to the demand for 
the period plus the error in the forecasting from the 
previous two periods.  An interesting ordering rule 
can be applied to the logic of an automated system.  
If the cumulative need for this period can be met 
from inventory and the arriving order without the 
inventory dropping below the base stock level, the 
quantity being order for the period should equal 
zero.  If the need can be exactly met by what is 
coming in, the order should be equal to demand.  
Additionally, if the need is in excess of what is in 
inventory and what is arriving, the order should be 
the demand plus the error in the forecast for the two 
previous periods.  The use of this policy brings the 
inventory position back to the desired level within 
two periods of any demand shock. 
 Automation of the system under the anti-
collaborative rule set corresponds to a significant 
savings in holding and backorder costs.  However, 
the players where asked what they would change if 
they were to play the game again, and they still 
desired to work together rather than automate the 
process. 
Collaborating in the Beer Game 
 The players said that they thought they could do a lot better if they were allowed to work 
together, so I let them try.  Collaboration within the constructs of the beer distribution game 
consists of simply talking to one another.  Additionally, the key feature to collaboration is that 
everyone upstream should know what actual customer demand was for each period. 
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 The game was played again, but this time I amended the rules.  Players were allowed to 
communicate, but communications were very limited.  They were allowed to speak only with the 
level directly above or below them, and they were only allowed to tell the other players what 
they intended to order for the next period and what they “forecasted” the demand coming from 
downstream would be.  The players were allowed to amend their order quantities after hearing 
their team mates’ orders to avoid excess stocks or backorders.   
Furthermore, instead of customer demand being given solely to the retailer, customer 
demand was announced such that all levels could hear it.  This process models point of sales 
information being distributed among all parties.  It allows each step to forecast total demands of 
the supply chain as well as their own level specific demands.  The results of the game are as 
follows:   
 
Inventory Position Results for the Collaborative Game 
 The first thing that should be noted 
when looking at the game results is how much 
the variability was reduced.  Another interesting 
point is to note the demand shock that occurred 
at the wholesaler level in the first couple weeks.  
The distributor and factory under non-
collaborative rules would have had similar 
shocks, but the shocks did not occur.  The 
wholesaler must have informed the distributor 
what they were doing such that the distributor 
did not follow suit in its ordering pattern. 
 The costs are significantly reduced 
for the second game and the players expressed a 
feeling of accomplishment.  They felt that they 
had done about as good as they could within the 
constructs of the game.  It is important to note 
that their costs were higher than the automated 
game results, but no automation was necessary 
for them to see significant savings. 
 The question was once again asked: 
what would you change about this game if you 
could change one thing?  The players could not 
think of anything else that they would do with 
the exception of some “outrageous” changes 
like allowing the retailer to make all the 
ordering decisions or to change the structure of 
the game to allow for a central warehouse with 
reduced lead times.  The requests sounded a lot 
like the concept of co-managing inventory, or 
CMI, so after a short deliberation the players 
were requested to come back and play a “new” 
beer game. 
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Co-Managed Inventory in the “New” Beer Distribution Game 
       CMI Game Inventory Position Results 
The “new” beer game is fundamentally a 
different game from the instructional game played 
the world over.  With Co-Managed Inventory there 
should, ideally, be only one location where 
inventory is held.  In the traditional beer game there 
are four stages of inventory holding, thus the 
game’s design had to be changed to account for 
CMI.  The new game had a central warehouse rather 
than the wholesaler and distributor.   
Under the new structure, the game could be 
played with as few as two people.  There would be a 
person making decisions at the retailer level and 
another person making decisions at the factory 
level.  The two would jointly decide how much 
inventory to keep in the central warehouse so there 
is no need for a local decision making unit at this 
level.  Since the two levels must work together, the 
rules to the game are modified to allow for 
collaboration similar to the game discussed in the 
previous section.  The results of the “new” beer 
game are shown to the right: 
The game, having been set up with 
substantial inventory stock piles at the central 
warehouse, had some variation in the first few 
weeks as the team tried to reduce their inventory 
levels to close to zero.  
Since the system was not automated, there were a few calculation errors that occurred in 
the ordering process.  These errors led to the mistakes, or backlogs, discussed previously.  The 
players, however, felt great about the game.  One member from the factory level even gave a 
member at the retail level a congratulatory high five when I called the game after week thirty-six.   
Conclusions concerning the Beer Game 
 Which game was the least expensive?  Due to the variability in starting inventory 
numbers at the beginning of the game and the fact that the players were not in control of their 
ordering for the first four weeks, the calculation of cost looks at periods ten through thirty.  The 
costs are as follows: standard rules - $991.50, Automation - $127, Information Sharing - 
$201.50, and CMI - $44. 
The costs associated with holding and backorders are typically far greater than these said 
costs and thus looking at the game scores in a relative fashion makes more sense than in absolute 
terms.  The cost savings seen from moving from the standard, “siloed” information, non-
collaborative structure to a collaborative CMI environment are on the order of 95%.   
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